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Sarah H. Bana
This dissertation contains three essays on vulnerable
workers—workers who have recently experienced a shock
that could adversely affect their labor market prospects. Each
chapter explores the mechanisms behind vulnerable workers’
earnings losses and the role of public policy in mitigating
these losses. I identify important factors in workers’ labor
market success, shedding light on the earnings determination
process. With a better understanding of relevant factors, I
assess whether state programs are allocating resources to the
most vulnerable workers.
In the first essay, I study displaced workers—those who
have lost their job as a result of a firm or plant closing. On
average, displaced workers experience large, long-lasting
earnings losses, but some displaced workers experience
larger earnings changes after displacement than others. I use
comprehensive occupational employment data to estimate
the effect of the state-level occupation growth rate in the
worker’s predisplacement occupation on subsequent labor
market outcomes. I find that adverse labor market conditions in a worker’s occupation at the time of displacement
have negative consequences. Displacement from a shrinking occupation is associated with decreased earnings and
longer durations of joblessness. Furthermore, holding the
occupation growth rate constant, there is only a small effect
of the worker’s industry growth rate on their labor market
outcomes. These results suggest that vulnerable displaced
workers’ difficulties in the labor market are a function of
their skills and less related to the goods and services they
were previously producing. The workers at greatest risk have
occupation-specific human capital that is less valuable after
their job loss, leading to either longer durations of joblessness or larger earnings losses.
Displaced workers are not the only workers who experience sizable and persistent earnings losses. More recently,
researchers have found a similar profile of losses among
mothers after the birth of their first child. It appears job displacement is not the only major life event with labor market
consequences. The second essay investigates the effect of
additional benefits on mothers who have new family responsibilities in California’s Paid Family Leave program.
Specifically, with my coauthors Kelly Bedard and Maya
Rossin-Slater, I use 10 years of California administrative
data with a regression kink design to estimate the causal
impacts of benefits in the first state-level paid family leave
(PFL) program for women with earnings near the maximum
benefit threshold. We find no evidence that a higher weekly
benefit amount increases leave duration or leads to adverse
future labor market outcomes for this group. In contrast, we
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document that a rise in the weekly benefit amount leads to an
increased likelihood of returning to the pre-leave firm (conditional on any employment) and of making a subsequent PFL
claim.
The PFL program in California falls under the larger
umbrella of state Disability Insurance (DI), both of which
have become important sources of social insurance, with
benefit payments now exceeding those of the state’s Unemployment Insurance program. However, there is considerable inequality in program take-up. While existing research
shows that firm-specific factors explain a significant part of
the growing earnings inequality in the United States, little
is known about the role of firms in determining the use of
public leave-taking benefits.
In the third essay, using administrative data from California with my coauthors Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater,
and Jenna Stearns, I find strong evidence that DI and PFL
program take-up is substantially higher in firms with high
earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the
firm premium is associated with a 57 percent higher claim
rate incidence. Put differently, take-up of temporary social
insurance programs is lower in lower earnings premium
firms. Workers at these firms, therefore, are more vulnerable
from both an earnings perspective and a benefits perspective. Our results suggest that changes in firm behavior have
the potential to impact social insurance use and thus reduce
an important dimension of inequality in America. Despite
near-universal program eligibility for workers, non-policydriven determinants of take-up play a major role.

Identifying Vulnerable Displaced Workers:
The Role of State-Level Occupation Conditions
Displaced workers, those who lose their job as a result of
a firm or plant closing, have large earnings losses on average. However, these large average losses mask substantial
variation across workers. What explains this variation? Prior
research shows that workers displaced when the national
unemployment rate is high experience larger earnings losses
than those displaced when the national unemployment rate is
low. But the national unemployment rate may mask substantial differences between workers in their labor market prospects. Specifically, a worker may have more or less difficulty
finding work depending on conditions in their occupation,
defined as the set of activities or tasks they are paid to perform, or their industry, defined as the primary business activity of their establishment. The roles of these predisplacement
employment attributes may shed light on the circumstances
under which a worker’s human capital may be less valuable.
This distinction is also important to effectively target job
search assistance to recently unemployed workers.
Attempts to perform such an analysis have been constrained by data limitations. Specifically, because occupation
is a worker-level characteristic with many options, annual
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occupational employment estimates to measure short-term
employment fluctuations do not exist in the United States.
I address this limitation by constructing a novel measure of
occupation conditions that captures short-term, state-level
fluctuations in occupational employment by combining existing data sets on the share of each occupation in an industry
and industry growth rates.
Then, using data from the Current Population Survey Displaced Worker Supplement, I study the effects of poor state
labor market conditions in a displaced worker’s occupation
of origin on a number of labor market outcomes. In models
comparing workers displaced from different occupations in
the same state and year net of occupation fixed effects, those
displaced from shrinking occupations suffer significantly longer durations of joblessness and lower earnings, conditional
on being reemployed. A one standard deviation decrease
in the worker’s occupation growth rate (which is approximately 4 percentage points) is associated with a 16.1 percent
increase in the duration of joblessness and a 9.2 percent
decrease in weekly earnings. Additionally, I find that statelevel occupation growth impacts durations of joblessness
significantly more than state-level industry growth does. The
estimated effect of the industry growth rate also diminishes
in all models, including the occupation growth rate. This
supports the claim that employment prospects depend much
more on workers’ occupation (the set of activities or tasks
that employees are paid to perform) than their industry (the
primary business activity of their establishment).
The idea that state-level occupation conditions matter is
quite intuitive, but their importance has not been measured
because of data limitations. Unlike industry codes, which
employers report when submitting information for unemployment insurance, regularly produced comprehensive
occupational employment data are only available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment
Statistics program and suffer from a significant limitation.
The data used to produce occupation employment estimates
for each year are collected in a three-year sampling cycle,
which means independent annual occupation employment
estimates are not produced. As a result, existing estimates
cannot capture short-term fluctuations in occupational
employment. I address this limitation by constructing an
occupation growth rate measure using a shift-share method
based on states’ different occupation and industry compositions and national industry growth rates. This measure of the
occupation growth rate takes into account the growth of all
industries that employ workers in a particular occupation in
the state to assess potential employment opportunities within
a displaced worker’s occupation.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to create a measure of local conditions within an occupation and to
estimate its importance for displaced workers’ labor market
outcomes. This new evidence that the relevant employment
conditions are at the occupation level suggests a significant
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role for occupation-specific human capital relative to
industry-specific human capital. In contrast to workers displaced from shrinking industries, there appears to be considerably less scope for workers from shrinking occupations to
find work with similar earnings.
This research builds on literature on specific human
capital, which shows that displaced workers who change
occupations, or skill portfolios, lose more than displaced
workers who change industries (Kambourov and Manovskii
2009; Poletaev and Robinson 2008). However, the decision
to change occupations or industries is endogenous, making it
difficult to attach a causal interpretation to these differences.
By identifying the occupation growth rate, an observable
factor associated with costly switching, I demonstrate a clear
relationship between decreased demand for occupational
services and its labor market consequences.
In addition, because industry- and occupation-switching
are outcomes of the postdisplacement job search process, the
act of switching cannot be used to target reemployment assistance to displaced workers. In this way, this paper contributes to the literature on targeting workers who are likely to
experience longer unemployment durations or large earnings
losses, while speaking to the efficacy of certain reemployment policies in the United States. For example, this paper
suggests that policies targeted at declining industries are
poorly focused because displaced workers’ difficulties are
more related to their skills than the goods and services they
were producing.
The effect of the occupation growth rate on displaced
workers’ labor market outcomes in this paper complements
existing research on the effects of adverse labor market
conditions on various groups, including displaced workers
(Davis and von Wachter 2011), economists (Oyer 2006)
and college graduates (Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2016;
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). In fact, the
magnitude of the main estimate in this paper (a 9.2 percent
decrease in weekly earnings per standard deviation decrease
in occupation growth rate) is similar to the short-run effects
of graduating during a typical recession found in Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) and Altonji, Kahn, and Speer
(2016). As this effect is strongest for the contemporaneous
occupation growth rate and not the occupation growth rate in
the prior year or two years ago, it appears that this loss can
be attributed to temporary adverse labor market conditions.
That said, unlike economy-wide recessions, the types of
shocks examined here depend also on workers’ state of residence and occupation. They are also net of controls for year
of displacement, state of residence, and minor occupation
group, and therefore demonstrate the impact of conditions
even more localized to the worker. As workers’ employment
prospects are dependent on conditions at the state and occupation level, aggregate indicators like the national unemployment rate mask the heterogeneity in employment prospects
within occupations, across states, and over time.
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Finally, this paper contributes to a long line of literature
interested in understanding displaced workers’ labor market outcomes. It relates most closely to Carrington (1993),
who argued that the wage losses of high-tenured displaced
workers can be attributed to downturns in industry, occupation, and state labor market conditions. The major insight of
Carrington’s paper, echoed by Neal (1995), is that workers
displaced from declining industries experienced significantly
greater wage losses than workers displaced from growing
industries. Based on the data available at the time, the Carrington study uses only 10 occupation categories, admitting
that this grouping is coarse, while the industry employment
measures are finer. As a result of these data limitations,
relevant employment growth at the industry level was much
better measured than relevant employment growth at the
occupation level, which suggested a strong role of industry
conditions and, potentially, industry-specific human capital.
With better data and a new method to identify an occupation growth rate, I find that occupation growth has a significantly larger role than industry growth in determining durations of joblessness, and has a significant relationship with
earnings changes, holding constant the industry growth rate.
This information is valuable for state workforce agencies,
who, since the Unemployment Compensation Amendments
of 1993, have been mandated to target job search assistance
to workers most likely to exhaust their unemployment insurance. By and large, however, our current social insurance
system is more likely to target using industry or industry
conditions than occupation or occupation conditions (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). In fact, not all states even
collect the occupation of unemployment insurance claimants.
As new technology has the potential to fundamentally affect
the labor market and it appears that workers of different
occupations will be affected differently (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock 2018), this information may be increasingly
useful in improving the provision of scarce resources for
reemployment assistance, based on information available to
the states at the time of displacement.

The Impact of Paid Family Leave Benefits:
Regression Kink Evidence from California
Administrative Data
(with Kelly Bedard and Maya Rossin-Slater)
A vast body of research has documented a persistent
“motherhood wage penalty” that can last 10 to 20 years after
childbirth. Mothers earn lower wages, work fewer hours,
and are less likely to be employed than fathers or childless
women and men (see, e.g., Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard
[2018] and Kleven et al. [2019], among others), and these
differences are particularly pronounced for highly educated
women at the top of the female earnings distribution
(Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Bertrand, Goldin,
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and Katz 2010; Chung et al. 2017; Hotchkiss, Pitts, and
Walker 2017). Paid family leave (PFL)—a policy that allows
working mothers to take time off work to recover from childbirth and care for their newborn (or newly adopted) children
while receiving partial wage replacement—may be a tool
for reducing this penalty if it facilitates career continuity
and advancement for women. However, opponents of PFL
caution that it could have the opposite effect: by allowing
mothers to have paid time away from work, PFL may lower
their future labor market attachment, while employers could
face substantial costs that lead to increased discrimination
against women. These discussions are especially fervent in
the United States, which is the only developed country without a national paid maternity or family leave policy.
We use administrative data from California—the first
state to implement a PFL program—and use a regression
kink (RK) design to identify the effects of the benefit amount
on leave duration, labor market outcomes, and subsequent
leave-taking among high-earning mothers. Isolating the
effect of the benefit amount is critical for informing debates
about payment during leave. Since the vast majority of
U.S. workers already have access to unpaid leave through
their employers and the federal Family and Medical Leave
Act, the wage replacement rate is arguably the most salient
parameter under debate. A long literature on other social
insurance programs finds a positive relationship between
the benefit amount and program participation duration, with
elasticities ranging between 0.3 and 2 in the case of UI (Card
et al 2015). As such, a higher PFL benefit may increase
maternity leave duration, which could in turn adversely affect
women’s subsequent labor market trajectories.
To identify the causal effect of benefits, we make use of
a kink in the PFL benefit schedule in California: during our
analysis time frame, participants get 55 percent of their prior
earnings replaced, up to a maximum benefit amount. Intuitively, we compare the outcomes of mothers with pre-leave
earnings just below and just above the threshold at which the
maximum benefit applies. These women have similar observable characteristics but face dramatically different marginal
wage replacement rates of 55 and 0 percent, respectively.
The RK method identifies the causal effect of the benefit
amount by testing for a change in the slope of the relationship between an outcome and preclaim earnings at the same
threshold (Card et al. 2016).
While a key advantage of the RK method is that it can
account for the endogeneity in the benefit amount, the
primary limitation is that the RK sample is not representative of the population of leave-takers. The kink is located
around the 92nd percentile of the California female earnings
distribution, and women in the vicinity of the kink point
are older and work in larger firms than the average female
program participant. That being said, high-earning women’s
careers may be especially sensitive to employment interruptions (Hotchkiss, Pitts, and Walker 2017; Stearns 2016).
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Additionally, RK estimates provide information about the
implications of benefit changes around the maximum benefit
threshold. These are highly policy relevant because all existing state PFL programs, as well as the current national PFL
proposal (the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, or
FAMILY Act), feature similar kinked benefit schedules but
have different kink point locations.
Our results show that higher benefits do not increase
maternity leave duration among women with earnings near
the maximum benefit threshold. Our RK estimates allow us
to rule out that a 10 percent increase in the weekly benefit
amount would increase leave duration by more than 0.3 to
2.1 percent (i.e., we can reject elasticities higher than 0.03 to
0.21), depending on the specification. Our results underscore
the notion that PFL provides a distinct type of social insurance and targets a unique population of parents and caregivers, making the (much larger) elasticities from the prior
social insurance literature less relevant for PFL (Krueger and
Meyer 2002).
We also find no evidence that PFL benefits have any
adverse consequences on subsequent maternal labor market
outcomes for high-earning women in our sample. A higher
benefit amount does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of returning to employment following the end of the
leave. However, conditional on returning to work, we find
that women who receive a higher benefit during leave are
more likely to return to their pre-leave employers rather than
find new jobs: a 10 percent increase in the weekly benefit
amount raises the likelihood of return to the pre-leave firm
(conditional on any employment) by 0.3 to 4.2 percentage
points (0.3 to 5 percent), depending on specification. While
our data do not allow us to observe the exact mechanisms
underlying this result, it is possible that higher benefits
during leave improve worker morale or promote firm loyalty
(even if she recognizes that her employer is not paying her
benefits directly), similar in spirit to efficiency wage models
(Akerlof 1984; Katz 1986; Krueger and Summers 1988;
Stiglitz 1986).

Unequal Use of Social Insurance: The Role
of Employers
(with Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater, and Jenna Stearns)
The dramatic rise in U.S. inequality in recent decades has
motivated a burgeoning literature on its causes and consequences along a number of dimensions, including wages,
income, wealth, health, and family structure. When it comes
to the growth in earnings inequality, recent research emphasizes the role of employers, finding that most of the increase
is due to widening earnings dispersion between, rather than
within, firms (Song et al. 2018). But less is known about the
influence of employers on other aspects of inequality among
Americans, or about nonwage differences between high12

paying and low-paying firms. In this paper, we aim to
understand how firms contribute to inequality in the use of
public short-term leave-taking social insurance programs,
which allow individuals to take partially paid leave for their
own medical issues or to care for new children or ill family
members.
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that access to
temporary social insurance has beneficial labor market and
health effects on workers and their families (e.g., RossinSlater 2018), and can even generate positive externalities for
the broader population (Stearns and White 2018). However,
the availability of short-term DI and PFL is highly limited in
the United States. There is no federal legislation, and only
five states have implemented public programs. Most firms
do not provide their own private benefits either, or if they do,
they do not necessarily offer them to all of their employees
(Kurani et al. 2017).
In addition to being limited, the use of short-term social
insurance in the United States is highly unequal. Even in
California, with almost universal eligibility of workers, DI
and PFL take-up rates are still substantially different across
industries, firm sizes, and earnings quartiles for both men
and women (Bana, Bedard, and Rossin-Slater 2018). As
most workers learn about public social insurance benefits
through their employers, and polls document that lack of
awareness about these programs is a major barrier to take-up
(DiCamillo and Field 2015), insights into the relationship
between firm characteristics and program use are critical for
understanding the drivers of these disparities.
This paper uses 10 years of administrative data from
California to provide the first evidence on the role of firms
in explaining differences in short-term social insurance
take- up. Drawing on a well-established literature that
demonstrates that observably similar firms pay observably
similar workers different wages (i.e., employer-specific wage
premiums, or firm fixed effects) (see, e.g., Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis 1999; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013, Card,
Cardosa, and Klein 2016; Song et al. 2018), we analyze the
relationship between the employer earnings premium and the
share of employees within a firm who take DI or PFL in any
given year. Whether firms with higher earnings premiums
are more or less conducive to benefit take-up is theoretically
ambiguous. Workers at higher premium firms might face a
higher opportunity cost of taking leave, or be more likely to
have access to private DI or PFL benefits that could crowd
out the use of public programs. But employers that offer
private benefits may have a particularly strong incentive to
encourage public benefit take-up, as it can lower the cost to
the firm. Higher earnings premium firms—which are likely
to be more innovative and productive than their lowerpremium counterparts (Barth et al. 2016; Faggio, Salvanes,
and Van Reenen 2010; Van Reenen 1996)—may also view
their wage-setting policies as complements to creating a
workplace culture conducive to leave-taking.
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To answer this question, we combine two data sets from
the California Employment Development Department: the
universe of DI and PFL claims over fiscal years 2004–2013,
and quarterly earnings data for nearly all California employees from 2000 to 2014. Our empirical strategy involves two
main steps. First, we estimate employer earnings premiums
using the seminal Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)
methodology that includes both worker and firm fixed effects
to account for nonrandom sorting of workers across firms.
Second, we aggregate the data to an employer-level panel
and estimate Poisson regressions of the number of social
insurance claims within a firm in a given year on the firm
earnings premium, controlling for firm size, industry, and
year fixed effects, and the percentage of female employees in
each industry year.
We find strong evidence that public temporary social
insurance program take-up is higher in firms with relatively
higher earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase
in the firm earnings premium is associated with a 57 percent
increase in the incidence rate of claims. The effect of the firm
premium is similar for claims made by men and women, and
exists for both DI and PFL. We also show that the effect is
largest for workers in the lower half of the employer-specific
earnings distribution, suggesting that a firm’s premium is
particularly important in determining the nonwage benefit
use of its lowest-earning employees. Although high-premium
firms have higher claim rates relative to low-premium firms,
they also have lower average leave durations and higher
employee retention rates following periods of leave.
The results indicate that characteristics of firm culture
that are reflected in the firm earnings premium may be key to
increasing take-up rates of public social insurance in California. If all firms behaved as those in the top third of the firm
premium distribution, a back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that take-up rates for DI and PFL would increase by
25 and 29 percent, respectively. By contrast, prior research
demonstrates that specific policy levers—such as the wage
replacement rate—have limited effects on take- up (Asai
2015; Ziebarth 2013; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010).
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the determinants of public short-term leave take-up. We know little
about non-policy-driven determinants of temporary social
insurance take-up. Research on the importance of workplace
culture in promoting work-family balance often relies on
case studies and small samples, and cannot shed light on
the characteristics of firms that support benefit take-up on a
broader scale (Clark 2001; Kelly, Moen, and Tranby 2011;
Moen et al. 2016). A separate literature on firm-specific
premiums has quantified their importance in driving wage
inequality (Card, Cardosa, and Klein 2016; Card, Heining,
and Kline 2013; Song et al. 2018), but less is known about
nonwage differences between high-premium and lowpremium firms. This paper bridges this gap by documenting
a strong and robust association between employer earnings
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premiums and the use of temporary paid leave. Our findings
suggest that firm-specific factors not only explain a substantial part of earnings dispersion, but also drive disparities in
the use of public social insurance benefits.
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